Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

2007

Clear and present danger: Brandenburg test after September 11,
2001
James Connor Best
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Mass Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Best, James Connor, "Clear and present danger: Brandenburg test after September 11, 2001" (2007). LSU
Master's Theses. 1639.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/1639

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER:
BRANDENBURG TEST AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Mass Communication
in
The Manship School of Mass Communication

by
James Connor Best
B.A., Louisiana State University, 2005
August 2007

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I thank God for the opportunity and grace to study here at LSU and
for blessing me with so many good gifts. I thank Dr. Emily Erickson for her patient advice.
Without her guidance, I could never have written a coherent paper. I thank the rest of my
committee, Drs. Kirby Goidel and James Stoner. Dr. Goidel has been an inspiring teacher, boss,
and friend. Dr. Stoner has been the driving force behind my intellectual formation. I essentially
have a minor (18 hours) in Stonerian political philosophy over the course of my education. I
would also like to thank the faculty and staff of the Manship School, my fellow graduate
students, and all of my friends and family for their love and support. Thank You!

ii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………….…….....ii
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….…….……..iv
Chapter
1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...…....1
2 The Emergence of the Court’s Incitement Doctrine: The Evolution of Two Traditions…..….8
A. Judge Hand’s Direct Incitement Test: Connecting Speech and Harm with Intent……..11
B. Holmes’ Clear and Present Danger Test: Connecting Speech and Harm Temporally...20
3 Understanding Brandenburg as a Jumbling of Two Distinct Incitement Tests………….…..26
4 The Court’s Application of Brandenburg since 1969……………………………………….….34
5 Applying the Incitement Test to Advocacy of Terrorism………………………….…………...36
6 Conclusion…………………………………………….……………………………….………….42
References…………………………………………….……………………………………………..44
Vita…………………………………………………………………………………………………..48

iii

Abstract
In a post-September 11, 2001 America and in light of the very real threat posed by radical
Islamic terrorist, the courts must rethink the line between protected speech and incitement to
violence. The Brandenburg test, which was previously understood to be the modern test to
distinguish protected from unprotected advocacy, should be questioned. By examining the
development of the Court’s First Amendment doctrine leading up to Brandenburg v. Ohio
(1969), I establish that Brandenburg is ill fitted to be applied to advocacy of terrorism. In
Brandenburg, the Court actually conflated two previously distinct speech tests—Judge Learned
Hand’s incitement test and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ clear and present danger test—
without explaining how these two tests fit together. In addition, the Court founded Brandenburg
on sandy soil. The Court failed to distinguish between the two traditions. They cited Hand’s
incitement tradition as precedent for the clear and present danger test. In doing so, they credited
Brandenburg’s imminence requirement to Hand’s direct incitement tradition, which did not
include an imminence requirement. Therefore, Brandenburg should be abandoned. I conclude
that the courts should apply the clear and present danger test and the direct incitement test
separately according to the particular circumstances of each case. I will give two modern
examples of advocacy of terrorism. I will show how the courts would be better off applying the
clear and present danger test as developed by Holmes and Brandeis in one case and the direct
incitement test as developed in by Judge Hand in the other. By taking a two test approach to
advocacy of terrorism, the government will better posses the tools it needs to protect national
security.

iv

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.1
Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people to peaceably assemble.2

Chapter 1
Introduction
How much speech does the First Amendment protect? The line between protected speech and
incitement to lawless action is blurry and has shifted many times in United States history.3
Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars have been trying to establish the line for nearly a hundred
years. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and in light of what President George W. Bush has called the “War on Terror,”4 some
scholars think that the time has come to redraw the line once again.5

1

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

2

U.S. CONST. amend I.

3

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n each case, [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the dangers,” cf. Chief Judge Learned Hand’s circuit court opinion, 183 F.2d (1950) at 212.);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“That necessity which is essential to a
valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger
of some substantive evil which the State may constitutionally seek to prevent.”); and Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”) These are just four of the many different articulations
of the line between protected and unprotected speech that the Court has drawn since it first started tying to draw the
line following World War I.

4

President George Walker Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (September 20,
2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

5

See Marin R. Scordato and Paula A Monopoli, PART III: Civil Liberties After September 11th: Free Speech
Rationales After September 11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. AND
POL’Y REV 185, 190 (2002) (arguing that we must question the parameters of the First Amendment as we strike a
balance between free speech and national security.); see also Robert S. Tanenbaum, Preaching Terror: Free Speech
or Wartime Incitement, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 785, 791-92 (2006) (arguing that either the Brandenburg’s imminence

The 9-11 attacks challenge anew the balance of personal liberty and national security.
Does the Constitution protect advocacy of terrorist activity?6 Certainly, precedent suggests that
it does, at least up to a point.7 But at what point does speech threaten the security of the nation?
This question must be considered in face of the very real threats posed by radical Islamic
terrorists. Regardless of whether one thinks speech advocating terrorism can and should be
restricted, no one can doubt the harm that proponents of terrorist activity hope to accomplish.
One scholar has called such advocacy the “purported source of terrorism,”8 defining it as
religious and political speech that advocates violent criminal activity against a civilian
population to further a political goal. Although this paper is concerned with advocacy of
terrorism, it also raises the broader question of the distinction between public and private
speech.9

requirement “be applied with an understanding of context rather than solely within the framework of temporal
limitations,” or that the Brandenburg test should not be the ruling precedent in terrorist cases. A non-Brandenburg
test should be constructed using the Dennis standard.); and Holly S. Hawkins, A Sliding Scale Approach for
Evaluating the Terrorist Threat over the Internet, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (2005) (arguing that the Dennis
standard should be applied instead of Brandenburg to terrorist websites that do not engage in marketplace, public
ideological advocacy.).
6

For the purposes of this paper, I refer to advocacy of terrorism as speech relating to religiously motivated violence
meant to instill terror in the civilian population. There is legally, however, no difference between advocacy of
terrorism and speech advocating other unlawful activity. For more information on the nuances of terrorism and
terrorist activity, see WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 1-10 (2005). See also,
Tanenbaum, supra note 5, at n15.

7

Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra note 3, at 447 (holding that speech must incite imminent lawless action and likely to
produce that action before it can be prohibited.); and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-324 (1957) (holding
that the government cannot prohibit advocacy of abstract ideas, but can prohibit advocacy of concrete action).

8

Tanenbaum, supra note 5, at 789. See also Holly Coates Keehn, Terroristic Religious Speech: Giving the Devil
the Benefit of the First Amendment Free exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1230, 1231-33
(1998) (“Terroristic speech is, at its heart, political speech - speech aimed at bringing down the governing authority
in favor of a new, and supposedly different, regime. Political speech is exactly what the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause was designed to protect. Therefore, some of the most powerful and feared leaders of radical, violent
groups can be difficult to stop when their role is limited to verbal encouragement of their followers.”).
9

Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the limits of free speech and religious liberty, 27 WHITTIER L.
REV. 3, 23 (2005) (“…a causal connection between unlawful action and the speech that preceded it. Where such a
nexus can be established, both speaker and the perpetrators should be held accountable.”)

2

At the heart of this particular free speech debate is the struggle between speech’s twin
potentials. One the one hand, speech is the life blood of democracy. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes contended that “every idea is an incitement,”10 meaning that ideas do not occur in a
vacuum but in the real world, where they have the power to change people’s actions and beliefs.
It is through this power that speech translates ideas into reality, which makes free government
possible. Therefore, the government cannot silence speech without limiting society’s ability to
engage in what Holmes called a “free trade in ideas.”11 On the other hand, however, speech can
be the spark that incites horrible crimes. Judge Learned Hand recognized in 1917 that words are
“triggers to action.”12 Or, as Justice Holmes recognized in Schenck v. United States, the First
Amendment cannot protect someone who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theater.13 The
government has an interest in prohibiting this type of speech, which causes harm apart from its
potential to communicate ideas. These two great potentials—the potential to enable selfgovernment and the potential to produce harm—represent the poles of the free speech debate.
The challenge for the courts, historically and today, is how to distinguish speech that fuels
democratic debate from speech that merely triggers criminal action.
Besides the difference between speech meant to persuade and speech meant to trigger
action, however, there is also a related difference between speech made in public and speech
made in private. Inherent in the above distinction is that when speech advocates an abstract idea,
10

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

11

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (contending that “the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,” and that the First Amendment requires us to tolerate speech that is
“fraught with death.”). In Abrams, Justice Holmes defends free speech because of its relationship to the search for
truth.
12

Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) (“Words are not only the keys of
persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by
any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic
state.").
13

Schenck, supra note 3, at 52.

3

it is completely protected; it is not always protected, however, when it advocates concrete
criminal action. The amount of protection that advocacy of action receives, then, should be a
function of its either public or private nature. When considering the First Amendment, there is a
logical difference between public speech and private speech. Logically, the First Amendment
should almost always protect public speech because of its proximity to the broader democratic
debate. Private speech that advocates criminal activity, however, should have somewhat less
protection because of its conspiratorial nature. Justice Jackson recognized this point in his
concurrence in Dennis v. United States14 when he distinguished between speech made in public
by an individual and private speech advocating criminal activity. He wrote, “The highest degree
of constitutional protection is due to the individual acting without conspiracy…,”15 but “the
Constitution does not make conspiracy a civil right.”16 The challenge for the Court, then, should
be to determine whether an instance of criminal advocacy is public or private according to the
facts of each case, and then accord it the appropriate amount of protection.
The United States Supreme Court articulated the current incitement test in 1969’s
Brandenburg v. Ohio.17 In Brandenburg, the Court advanced a three-pronged approach to
determine whether speech could be restricted. The Court ruled that the First Amendment
protects speech unless speech “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”18 In other words, the speech must (1) intend to incite (2)

14

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).

15

Id. at 570.

16

Id. at 573.

17

Supra note 3.

See Keehn, Terroristic supra note 8, at 1244 (“The ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine found its most modern
expression in Brandenburg v. Ohio.”); Richard A. Parker, Brandenburg v. Ohio, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL:
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 145 (2003) (calling Brandenburg
“singularly significant precisely because it articulated the current standard for identifying the judicial limits of
tolerance for such expression.”); and David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50

4

imminent lawless action and will (3) likely produce the action. Following September 11, 2001,
however, many scholars quickly realized that Brandenburg’s second prong, known as the
“imminence standard,” would stand in the way of prosecuting advocacy of terrorism,19 a class of
speech that many times is not time specific.
Although Brandenburg is widely recognized as the modern incitement standard, it is not
without its critics. Long before the current crisis, one scholar has cautioned that “No language in
the per curiam opinion elaborated the single sentence in which the Court announced its striking
new standard….Brandenburg might not have intended the literal meaning of its own
language.”20 Another scholar argued that Brandenburg contradicts itself because it introduced
the most speech protective test yet, while claiming that it was nothing new and was fully
consistent with earlier precedents.21 A casual reading of the short, six-page per curiam opinion

U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1351 (1983) (claiming that “subsequent decisions by Burger court have reaffirmed the
Brandenburg Test,” but also acknowledging that “the Brandenburg standard still remains uncertain.”).
18

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).

19

See Tanenbaum, Comment: supra note 5, at 791-92 (arguing that either Brandenburg’s imminence requirement
“be applied with an understanding of context rather than solely within the framework of temporal limitations,” or
that the Brandenburg test is not the ruling precedent in terrorist cases and that a non-Brandenburg test should be
constructed using the Dennis standard.); Hawkins, supra note 5 (arguing that the Dennis standard should be applied
instead of Brandenburg to terrorist websites that do not engage in marketplace, public ideological advocacy.);
Thomas Crocco, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of Brandenburg to Terrorist Websites, 23 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 451 2004) (arguing that Brandenburg only applies to public advocacy, or “soap box” speech,
not terrorist speech.).
See also Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm, and Self-government: Understanding the Ambit of the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (1991) (arguing that the Brandenburg test only makes sense in situations
where the presence of more, competing speech would have made a difference. If the presence of rebutting and
competing speech would not have changed the outcome, the Brandenburg test cannot logically be applied.); Rabban,
supra note 17, at 1351 (arguing that Brandenburg may not have meant all that it said, citing the differences between
“public ideological solicitation” and “private nonideological solicitation.”); and William Wiecek, The Legal
Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375
(2001) (claiming that Brandenburg only applies to political speech).
20

Rabban, supra note 17, at 1351.

21

Marc Rohr, Grand Illusions? The Brandenburg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2002) (“The Court had just articulated a verbal formula that appeared more protective
of seditious advocacy than any statement ever before made in a Supreme Court majority opinion, yet it was
simultaneously suggesting that (a) this was nothing new, and (b) it was fully consistent with a decision (Dennis) that
had upheld the conviction of advocates of revolution without any concern for the ‘imminence’ or ‘likelihood’ of that

5

might lead one to believe that Brandenburg’s three-part test, including intent to incite,
imminence and likelihood, is the culmination of what earlier precedents had developed. The
sentence announcing the new “Brandenburg test” began with the words, “These later decisions
have fashioned the principle that….”22 What the Court meant by “These later decisions,”
however, is not clear. The doctrinal bases of the incitement test are not explicated in the text and
can only be extrapolated from the precedents cited by the Court.
A few scholars have tried to explain Brandenburg, suggesting that it did more than it
claimed to do. It did not merely rearticulate prior incitement tests; it synthesized two competing
incitement traditions:23 a direct incitement test born in Judge Hand’s U.S. District Court opinion
in Masses v. Patten24 and the clear and present danger tradition that began with Holmes’ majority
opinion in Schenck v. United States.25 In synthesizing these two tests, however, the Court failed
to fully reconcile the vast differences between these two competing traditions. It certainly did
not explain how the two came together in Brandenburg. In effect, the Court conflated two tests
that it had previously applied to different types of speech.
revolution. Either the author of the opinion was being quite disingenuous, or the apparently highly-protective new
test was not meant to provide as much protection as its words suggested.”).
22

Brandenburg, supra note 18, at 447. The footnote to the above sentence read:

n2 It was on the theory that the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U. S. C. § 2385, embodied such a principle and that it
had been applied only in conformity with it that this Court sustained the Act's constitutionality. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). That this was the basis for Dennis was emphasized in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 320-324 (1957), in which the Court overturned convictions for advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the
Government under the Smith Act, because the trial judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere advocacy,
unrelated to its tendency to produce forcible action.
23

Staughton Lynd, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test For All Seasons, 43 U. CHI L. REV. 515, 159-160 (1975)
(“The importance of Brandenburg lies precisely in the fact that it is neither an incitement test, nor a clear and
present danger test, but a combination of the two, requiring both elements [incitement and clear and present danger]
before speech may be forbidden or proscribed.”); See also, Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722 (1975) (“Today’s
operative first amendment doctrine, as first enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, can be viewed as a
coalescing of the best features of the two contending approaches.”).
24

Supra note 15; rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2nd Cir. 1917).

25

Supra note 3.

6

The paper will explore the doctrinal origins of the Brandenburg test to show how Hand’s
direct incitement test and Holmes’ clear and present danger test evolved. It will explore to which
types of speech each test ideally should be applied and argue that the distinction between public
and private speech has always been implicit in the differences between the two traditions. It
suggests that advocacy of terrorism would be dealt with best by abandoning Brandenburg
altogether, and applying Hand’s incitement test and the clear and present danger test separately
according to the circumstances of each case. First, I will explore the complex and often muddled
development of the Court’s direct incitement and clear and present danger doctrines. Second, I
will establish that the justices in Brandenburg did an inadequate job synthesizing the two tests.
Third, I will argue each test is better applied separately. Ultimately, judges should abandon
Brandenburg as the controlling precedent in advocacy of terrorism cases and apply each test
separately. In short, if the speech is done in private, it should trigger the direct incitement test;
and if it is done in public, it should be subjected to the clear and present danger standard.
Chapter 2 will analyze the development of both criminal advocacy traditions and
demonstrate that they historically applied to different types of speech. Chapter 3 will examine
Brandenburg and show how it muddled the distinction between the two formerly distinct
traditions. Chapter 4 will show how, since 1969, the Courts have only applied Brandenburg to
cases of public advocacy where the government faced the potential of imminent lawless action.
Chapter 5 will analyze two recent cases involving advocacy of terrorism and show how Hand’s
direct incitement test and the clear and present danger test, when disentangled from each other,
provide a clear means to determine when advocacy of terrorism should be protected by the First
Amendment – and when it should not. The conclusion will argue that in the wake of September
11, 2001 and in the face of the threat posed by radical Islamic terrorists, the courts should
abandon Brandenburg altogether, break apart the tests, and instead apply them separately.
7

Hand’s direct incitement test should be applied to speech advocating terrorism when its false
cries of “fire” are not made in a public theater. When the shouts are made in public, however,
they should be judged according to whether they produce imminent action under the clear and
present danger test.

8

Chapter 2
The Emergence of the Court’s Incitement Doctrine: the Evolution of Two Traditions
The Court’s path to Brandenburg v. Ohio has been anything but smooth and unbroken. The
Court’s modern incitement jurisprudence emerged when America entered into World War I.
Attempts to establish the line between speech and criminal incitement began in earnest in the late
1910s. At various times along the path, the Court has alternatively ignored the First
Amendment, endowed it with far-reaching protective power, and sometimes even gutted it of any
real meaning.26 Moreover, the Court has never adopted a single First Amendment rationale in
this area, but has instead used a hodgepodge of rationalizations to justify either protecting or
prohibiting different types of speech.27 These different approaches can be divided into two
categories: a direct incitement test that focused on the speaker’s intent, and a clear and present
danger test that focused on the elapsed time between the speech and harm. The direct incitement
test measures the direct link between speech and harm using intent established by the
communicative meaning of the words. The clear and present danger test determines whether the
link between speech and harm is direct by gauging how quickly the harm followed the speech.
Although the two tests were occasionally intermingled in the jurisprudence, their ultimate

26

See Brandenburg, supra note 18, at 447 (“The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”); Dennis,
supra note 3, at 510 (“[I]n each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dangers,” cf. Chief Judge Learned
Hand’s circuit court opinion, 183 F.2d (1950) at 212.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (majority
opinion) (holding that the state government had extensive leeway to curtail speech that may produce ill effects);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (majority opinion) (holding that the state government had extensive
leeway to curtail speech that may produce ill effects); and Schenck, supra note 3, at 52 (“The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.”).
.
27

Scordato and Monopoli, supra note 5 (arguing that there are many competing rationales for free speech including
personal expression, self-government, the marketplace of ideas, and the fourth estate.). See also, Rabban, supra note
17, at 1320-22 (arguing that Brandeis accepted more libertarian and self-government rationales for speech and
considered speech “the essential prerequisite of a democracy.”).

9

synthesis was executed in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which required the government to prove both
intent and imminence before it could restrict speech. To fully understand Brandenburg,
therefore, one must understand the development of these two distinct traditions and understand
how the Court reconciled the intent and imminence requirements.
Although the states ratified the First Amendment over two hundred years ago, the United
States court system did little to extrapolate its meaning until World War I. In fact, the courts did
not even participate in the first controversy over the meaning of free speech and press. The
Alien and Sedition controversy raged less than ten years after the First Amendment’s ratification
when Congress, under Federalist control, passed legislation to criminalize criticism of John
Adams’ administration. The controversy was settled when the Jeffersonian Republicans won the
election of 1800 and did not renew the acts. By winning the election, their interpretation of the
First Amendment triumphed. Thus, the First Amendment’s initial meaning was politically
constructed rather than constitutionally interpreted.28 The Jeffersonian Republicans maintained
that free speech and press were essential to republican government and that the Constitution did
not grant the federal government the power to regulate speech.29 They did not see a problem,
however, with state prosecutions of speech largely along the lines of English common law of
seditious libel. The Jeffersonian Republican reading of the First Amendment’s free speech and
press clauses, which forbade federal prosecutions of speech while allowing state prosecutions,

28

See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 1-8 (1999) (discussing the differences between
constitutional constriction, judicial interpretation, and constitutional amendments).
29

For an account of the Jeffersonian Republican rationale for free speech and press, see JAMES MADISON, REPORT
MADISON’S WRITINGS, VI,
386 (1900-10).

ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS, 1799-1800 SESSION, VIRGINIA STATE ASSEMBLY,

10

therefore, became the dominant free speech paradigm at the federal level for the next one
hundred years.30
Between the Alien and Sedition controversy in the late 1700s and America’s entry into
World War I, there were very few developments in First Amendment doctrine beyond the
enforcement of the English common law of seditious libel at the state level, or became known as
the bad tendency test. In two important cases, Patterson v. Colorado31 and Fox v. Washington,32
the Court upheld the dominant First Amendment regime, which was essentially the common law
seditious libel enforced at the state level. Both cases involved state prosecutions of speech
focusing on very speculative ill effects, or “bad tendency” of the speech to cause harm. Under
this standard, states merely had to assert that speech had a tendency to harm the public welfare or
would likely promote actions that the states had the power to forbid under their police powers.33
At the time, the Supreme Court had not extended the First Amendment’s protection against state
governments, so they had abundant leeway to curtail speech by suggesting it was likely produce
ill effects.
Shortly after America entered World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Acts of
1917,34 which it amended in 1918, in an effort to repress “political agitation…of a character
directly affecting the safety of the state.”35 The Espionage Act was the first federal law
restricting dissent since the original Alien and Sedition acts. Soon after its passage, a plethora of
30

See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) and JAMES MORTON SMITH FREEDOMS FETTERS
(1956).
31

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).

32

Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).

33

DAVID M. RABBAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132 (1997).

34

Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, as amended, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553.

35

John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N 275, 277, 300 (1919); cited in
Rabban, supra note 17, at 1217.
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cases challenged the constitutionality of the Espionage Act and the federal government’s power
to censor speech. This period marked the beginning of both the direct incitement and clear and
present danger tests.

A. Judge Hand’s Direct Incitement Test: Connecting Speech and Harm with Intent
The Original Direct Incitement Test
Although almost all of the early incitement cases under the Espionage Act led to convictions, one
case stands out as an example of how the act could be construed in a speech-protective way. In
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,36 Max Eastman, publisher of The Masses magazine, a “monthly
revolutionary journal,” asked the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York to
grant an injunction against the enforcement of the Espionage Act’s nonmailable clause. The
clause forbade the dissemination of material that willfully caused or attempted to cause
insubordination, disloyalty mutiny, or refusal of duty within the armed forces, or that willfully
obstructed the military’s recruiting efforts through the mails. In his decision, Judge Learned
Hand granted an injunction against the act’s enforcement because the words of the magazine did
not amount to a direct incitement to criminal activity. Hand did not use the “bad tendency” test
in coming to his decision, however. That test focused on the probable future consequences or
“bad tendency” of speech, and Hand doubted whether judges could foresee the future well
enough to determine speech’s tendency or future effects. Instead, while acknowledging that
words can be “triggers to action,”37 Hand reasoned that even speech advocating criminal activity
should not constitute incitement if “one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty…to
36

Supra note 15.

37

Id. at 545 (“Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those which have no purport
but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is
the final source of government in a democratic state.").

12

resist the law.”38 But, if it did, the government could prohibit it. The direct incitement test
focused on the intent of the speech—did the speech directly intend to produce harm? Was there
a direct connection between the speaker’s intent and the harm threatened? Hand found that none
of the language or cartoons in The Masses crossed the line of direct incitement. Therefore, the
government could not censor it under the Espionage Act.
For Hand, the line between protected and unprotected speech was the line between direct
incitement and abstract advocacy. If the government could restrict anything less than a direct,
clear intention to produce criminal activity, a person’s ability to criticize government or engage
in abstract academic discussions would be severely limited. He wrote that the “normal
assumption of democratic government” is that criticism of the government, even “by immoderate
and indecent invective,” is “the privilege of the individual” and “the ultimate source of
authority.”39 And, even if “the indirect result of the language might be to arouse a seditious
disposition,” the government could not prosecute speech unless it directly advocated lawless
action.40 Under this reasoning, which required the government to prove the words were intended
to incite criminal action, Hand’s direct incitement test was far more speech-protective than the
pre-war bad tendency test.
Hand’s standard, however, was quickly rejected by the appeals court. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed his injunction and applied the bad tendency standard instead. The
circuit court found that the government could restrict speech anytime the “the natural and
reasonable effect” of speech encourages “resistance to a law.”41 It did not matter whether the

38

Id. at 540.

39

Id. at 539.
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Id. at 542. See also, Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Jan. 2, 1921, cited in Gunther, supra note
23, at 770 (“I should prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade.”).

41

Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
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speech directly or indirectly incited the criminal activity. The Second Circuit also found that the
speech did not have to be a direct incitement to a crime in order to be prosecuted.42 Where
Hand’s test required intent for the words to produce ill effects, the Second Circuit only required
the government to prove speech would have the “natural and reasonable effect” of producing
harm. This was not the death knell for Hand’s incitement test, however. Instead, it continued to
have influence through Hand’s correspondence with Justice Holmes and Professor Zachariah
Chafee in the years that followed.43
Eventually, the ideas underlying Hand’s incitement test found their way into a U.S.
Supreme Court majority opinion, although only nominally. In Gitlow v. New York,44 the
defendant was being prosecuted for publishing “The Left Wing Manifesto” and “The
Revolutionary Age,” two pamphlets that advocated the overthrow of the government. Although
the Court majority used the bad tendency test to reach a speech-restrictive outcome, it considered
the dichotomy between abstract advocacy and direct incitement in dicta – something the pre-war
bad tendency test had never included. Without specifically citing Hand or Masses, it
commended the New York law in question because it “does not penalize the utterance or
publication of abstract ‘doctrine’ or academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any
concrete action.”45 Abstract advocacy was protected while direct or “concrete” incitement was
not. But, after addressing this distinction, the majority proceeded to uphold the defendant’s
conviction, even though it was clearly abstract advocacy. The Court reinforced this distinction,
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Id. at 38 (It is not “necessary that an incitement to crime must be direct.”).
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Gunther, supra note 23.
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268 U.S. 652 (1925).

45

Id. at 664.
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also without reference to Hand or the incitement test, in the 1931 case Stromberg v. California.46
In Stromberg, however, the distinction was actually used to overturn the conviction of a woman
for displaying a Communist flag in her front yard. The Court ruled that displaying one’s
political affiliations formed an essential part of the nation’s “free political discussion.”47 In
neither of these two cases, however, did the Court recognize Hand’s direct incitement
contribution. It was not until 1951 that the Court explicitly treated and applied Hand’s direct
incitement test.
Hand’s Test is Revived and Applied to Communist Conspiracy
By 1950, Judge Hand was the chief judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Now, thirtythree years after his first articulation of a direct incitement test in Masses, Hand had a second
chance to have his test validated. In Dennis v. United States,48 the Second Circuit was faced with
the question of whether to apply the clear and present danger test as it had been developed by
Holmes and Brandeis to a case of Communist conspiracy to overthrow the government. The
defendants had been convicted under the federal Smith Act49 for organizing a group that
knowingly advocated the violent overthrow of the government – and also for conspiring to do so.
The defendant, the jury had found, transformed the Communist Party into an organization
dedicated to overthrowing the government through violence and sabotage totally outside of the
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283 U.S. 359 (1931) (holding that displaying a red communist flag in a front yard constitutes constitutionally
protected speech because it participated in “free political discussion.”).
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Id. at 569 (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to
the security of the Republic is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute which upon its face,
and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this
opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950) (Hand, J.), aff’d 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, §§ 2 (a) (1), 2(a)(3) and 3.
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democratic process.50 Unlike previous communist organizations, the present organization did
not function within the political process as other political parties did. There was no attempt at
public, ideological advocacy.
In considering the case, Hand declined to apply the clear and present danger test. He
instead breathed new life into his direct incitement test. He found that where speech constitutes
a direct incitement to criminal activity, it does not merit protection. He argued that although
incitements are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value,”51 the government cannot prohibit them unless “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”52 Thus,
courts must take into account three considerations: (1) Is the speech a direct incitement? (2) Is
the danger serious? And, (3) is the speech likely to produce the danger? If the answer to all
three questions was yes, the government could prohibit the speech.
The following year, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Hand’s decision and the
application of his direct incitement test. A four member plurality of the Court, led by Chief
Justice Vinson, explicitly adopted Hand’s language—gravity and improbability.53 A fifth
member of the Court, Justice Jackson, echoed Hand’s direct incitement language in his
50

See, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 498 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“By virtue of their control over the
political apparatus of the Communist Political Association, petitioners were able to transform that organization into
the Communist Party; that the policies of the Association were changed from peaceful cooperation with the United
States and its economic and political structure to a policy which had existed before the United States and the Soviet
Union were fighting a common enemy, namely, a policy which worked for the overthrow of the Government by
force and violence; that the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into strategic
positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning language; that the Party is rigidly controlled; that Communists, unlike
other political parties, tolerate no dissension from the policy laid down by the guiding forces, but that the approved
program is slavishly followed by the members of the Party; that the literature of the Party and the statements and
activities of its leaders, petitioners here, advocate, and the general goal of the Party was, during the period in
question, to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.”).
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Dennis, supra note 48, at 236; citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1952).
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Id. at 212. Justice Vinson, writing for the plurality, adopted Hand’s phrasing of the incitement test, Dennis, supra
note 50, at 510.
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Dennis, supra note 50, at 510.
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concurrence, although without reference to Hand. Jackson wrote, “I think direct incitement by
speech or writing can be made a crime.”54 Thus, the majority of the Court accepted a direct
incitement test with four justices explicitly adopting Hand’s reformulated version of the direct
incitement test.
Justice Vinson, in the plurality opinion, defended the application of the direct incitement
test to cases of Communist conspiracy, saying that the circumstances of Dennis separated it from
earlier incitement cases where the Court had applied the clear and present danger test.55 Since
the Communist party of the 1950s did not function as a legitimate political party, it did not merit
protection in the same way other political parties had.56 Because the speech in Dennis advocated
violence in secret rather than in public, the Court had to apply a different test. Although Vinson
used the phrase “clear and present danger” in his decisions, he did not to apply the test as justices
Holmes and Brandeis had articulated it.57 Vinson wrote in the plurality opinion, “The situation
with which Justices Holmes and Brandeis were concerned in Gitlow was a comparatively
isolated event….They were not confronted with any situations comparable to…the development
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Id. at 571.
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See infra section II. B. for a discussion of the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test.
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Dennis, supra note 50, at 498 (“By virtue of their control over the political apparatus of the Communist Political
Association, petitioners were able to transform that organization into the Communist Party; that the policies of the
Association were changed from peaceful cooperation with the United States and its economic and political structure
to a policy which had existed before the United States and the Soviet Union were fighting a common enemy,
namely, a policy which worked for the overthrow of the Government by force and violence; that the Communist
Party is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into strategic positions, use of aliases, and doublemeaning language; that the Party is rigidly controlled; that Communists, unlike other political parties, tolerate no
dissension from the policy laid down by the guiding forces, but that the approved program is slavishly followed by
the members of the Party; that the literature of the Party and the statements and activities of its leaders, petitioners
here, advocate, and the general goal of the Party was, during the period in question, to achieve a successful
overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.”). See also, American Communications Association v.
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of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the government.”58 Whereas in
earlier cases the government was concerned with speech threatening imminent harm—its direct
impact on the military’s recruiting, for example—in Dennis the government was concerned with
harm a conspiracy to overthrow the government would create at a future point of time. The
danger was at some indefinite point in the future “when the leaders [of the Communist Party]
feel the circumstances permit.”59 Therefore, the Court could not use an imminence requirement
to determine whether the government could restrict the speech—there was no threat of imminent
danger. The Court had to connect the speech to harm using intent rather than temporal
imminence. This meant the government had to prove that the defendants’ speech had directly
and explicitly incited the overthrow of the government and went beyond academic discussion of
overthrowing the government. Did the defendants’ speech directly intend to incite the overthrow
of the government? Or, rather did their speech threaten an imminent danger of overthrowing the
government? In Dennis, the Court found that the speech had directly incite the overthrow of the
government.
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, went even further than the Court plurality was
willing to go in distinguishing the circumstances in Dennis from those in other cases involving
isolated acts of public advocacy. Jackson argued that the clear and present danger test only
applied when the speech created a threat of danger, but did not explicitly advocate a crime.60
Moreover, when speech directly advocated a crime, the government did not have to prove a clear
and present danger. Therefore, the clear and present danger test had never been applied in cases
58

Dennis, supra note 50, at 510.
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Id. at 509.
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Dennis, supra note 50, at 569 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The [clear and present danger] test applies and has
meaning where a conviction is sought to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly
advocate a crime, but to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by construction or by implication from
external circumstances….I think reason is lacking for applying the test in this case.”).
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of conspiracy, which directly incites a crime without posing an imminent threat.61 Since the
defendants in Dennis were involved in what Jackson called a “period of incubation; its
preliminary stages of organization and preparation”62 of the conspiracy, the clear and present
danger test could not be applied. 63 It only applied to isolated acts of public advocacy that
threatened to result in violence.
The direct incitement test was again refined by the Supreme Court six years later is Yates
v. United States,64 when the Court explicitly limited the government’s ability to restrict speech to
cases of advocacy of criminal action. In Yates, the Court reviewed the conviction of a group of
defendants convicted under almost exactly the same circumstances in Dennis. But here, the
Court found that the lower courts had overstepped the constitutionally protected line of free
speech. The difference between Dennis and Yates, however, was a question of fact decided by
the jury. The defendants in Yates were conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government
– in other words, they were engaging in abstract advocacy. In Dennis, however, the defendants
were conspiring to overthrow the government.65 The nature of their speech was closer to actual
criminal conspiracy than to abstract discussion. Thus, Yates made it clear that the Dennis did not
give the government a blank check to prohibit seditious speech. Instead, the government could
only restrict speech that constituted a direct incitement to criminal activity.
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Id. (“What really is under review here is a conspiracy.”).
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Id.
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Id. at 570 (“The highest degree of constitutional protection is due to the individual acting without conspiracy. But
even an individual cannot claim that the Constitution protects him in advocating or teaching overthrow of
government by force or violence.”)
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354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957) (“In failing to distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract
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Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future time was enough.”).
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The Direct Incitement Test Applied to Association
Two other cases highlighted the development of direct incitement jurisprudence: Scales v.
United66 and Noto v. United States.67 In another dimension of incitement jurisprudence, the
Court drew a line between protected and unprotected association with organizations that
advocate criminal activity.68 In Scales, the Court upheld a conviction of an active member of the
Communist Party because he was in full agreement with the party platform. The Court found
that a “blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims” would
endanger the right of political express and association.69 Therefore, there must be “clear proof”
that a defendant is “specifically intending to accomplish [the group’s aims] by resort to
violence.”70 The Court, however, did find sufficient evidence showing the defendant’s specific
intent to accomplish the Communist Party’s violent aims. In Noto, however, the Court reversed
an association conviction along the same reasoning, because the defendant had not been an
active member and did not share the aims of the party. There was not sufficient evidence
connecting the defendant to the Communist Party’s criminal goals. From Noto and Scales the
First Amendment’s free association clause protects a person who indirectly associates with a
group that advocates criminal activity. The First Amendment does not protect a person, however
who is in active agreement with the group’s illegal intent. The courts must determine whether a
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367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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367 U.S. 290 (1961).
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This is essentially the same line as the line between advocacy of an idea and advocacy of action. Both
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person intends to accomplish illegal activity as a part of the group. 71 Intent is established by
determining the extent to which person participates and agrees with the illegal aims of a group.
Thus, in the little over a decade between Dennis and the association cases of the 1960s,
Hand’s reformulation of the direct incitement test came into its own. In situations where the
government was not concerned with speech or association producing imminent action, the courts
applied Hand’s direct incitement test, although without citing either Hand or Masses. And if the
speech constitutes abstract advocacy, the government could not prohibit it. The Court applied
this test without explicitly distinguishing it from other incitement jurisprudence. In these cases,
the government had to prove that the speaker intended to produce criminal action. Where speech
or association met the direct incitement or active participation standard, the courts determined
whether the gravity of the evil threatened, less its improbability, merited prohibition. In sum, the
direct incitement test determined whether speech directly intended to create a grave danger.
Thus, if speech directly intended to incite grave criminal action and it would likely do so, it
could be restricted. The direct incitement test should be applied in circumstances of private
speech.

B. Holmes’ Clear and Present Danger Test: Connecting Speech and Harm Temporally
Holmes’ Original Clear and Present Danger Test
Two years after Judge Hand decided Masses v. Patten, the first incitement cases under the
Espionage Act began to reach the Supreme Court. In the spring of 1919, in Schenck v. United
States,72 Justice Holmes first articulated what has become known as the clear and present danger

71
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test. Schenck had been convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the draft by printing and circulating a
flyer claiming the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s provision against involuntary
servitude. In upholding the conviction, Holmes wrote, “The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”73 Holmes determined that the flyer had posed
a clear and present danger of obstructing the draft. While Hand focused on the intent of the
speech, Holmes focused on the temporal distance between speech and its effects. It was a
question of proximity and degree. Hand connected speech to its ill effects using its direct intent,
Holmes’ connected speech to its effects temporally without examining the intent.74 Despite
introducing the clear and present danger test, however, Schenck did not mark a radical new
direction in incitement jurisprudence. The outcome of the case, sustaining the defendant’s
conviction, was not any different than it would have been under the speech restrictive, pre-war
bad tendency test.75 Thus, the clear and present danger test was new in rhetoric only.
The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine becomes Speech Protective
In the following Court term in the fall of 1919, the clear and present danger doctrine took a
major turn from being a speech restrictive to a speech permissive test. Although Holmes had
construed the clear and present danger test restrictively in Schenck, he used it to defend free
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speech in his dissent in Abrams v. United States.76 The government prosecuted Abrams for
unlawfully printing and distributing leaflets criticizing United States’ anti-socialist involvement
in Russia after the fall of the Czar’s regime. Although the majority voted to uphold the
conviction, Holmes, joined by Brandeis, argued that the speech in Abrams did not rise to the
level of a clear and present danger. Holmes rearticulated the test by writing, “It is only the
present danger of immediate evil…that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression.”77
He tightened the link between speech and harm from “clear and present” to “present danger of
immediate evil.” Speech must pose a temporally imminent danger. Therefore, after Abrams in
the Holmesian conception, the clear and present danger test determined whether speech posed a
danger of temporally imminent danger.
The biggest advancement in the clear and present danger doctrine came in Brandeis’
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.78 Charlotte Anita Whitney was on trial for her
association with the Communist Party of California, which the prosecution alleged advocated the
overthrow of the government. Even though Whitney had been an active member of the party,
while serving on the platform committee, she had actually voted against the parts of the party
platform advocating the overthrow of the government. The majority opinion ignored her
disagreement with the party platform, however. Using a rationale similar to the pre-war bad
tendency test, which did not distinguish between direct incitement and abstract advocacy, the
majority of the Court upheld her conviction. Although Brandeis, joined by Holmes, concurred in
the decision, his concurrence sounded much more like a dissent. He sharply criticized the
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majority opinion because it did not apply the clear and present danger test to the case. In
applying the test, he rearticulated it by noting, “Valid restriction does not exist unless speech
would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil
which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled.”79 Under his articulation,
the government had to prove that speech fit three criteria. First, speech must intend to produce
substantive evil action80—not only must the evil be serious, but also the speech must intend to
produce the action. Brandeis distinguished between abstract advocacy and direct incitement.81
This was in fact the same distinction Hand had made—direct incitement—but without reference
to Hand’s direct incitement test. Second, Brandeis argued that the danger threatened must be
clear and imminent; there must be a temporally imminent connection between speech and harm.
To define imminence, he wrote, the “evil apprehended [must be] so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion.”82 Third, speech must be likely to produce the
harm it threatens.83 The government cannot prosecute idle threats. Therefore, the government
can only prohibit speech when it amounts to an incitement that poses so imminent and likely a
danger of substantive evil that the government has no choice prohibit it. In applying his new
formulation to the facts of the case, Brandeis decided that the facts of the case were not
sufficiently clear to determine whether Whitney’s association with the party amounted to a direct
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incitement or not — thus, he concurred instead of dissented. After Whitney, it is clear that
Brandeis’ version of the clear and present danger test included a distinction between concrete
incitement and abstract advocacy as well as temporal imminence and likelihood requirements.
Even though the Brandeis did include an incitement standard, the focus of his test was
imminence rather than direct intent as in Hand. As it developed in the 1930s and 1940s,
however, the speech protective clear and present danger test emphasized the imminence
requirement as the principle consideration when applying the test.84
The clear and present danger test amounted to largely an effects-based test to determine
whether the context of speech presented a clear and present danger of substantial evil, although it
did incorporate an advocacy versus incitement element. The focus of the test was to determine
whether the connection between the speech and harm were temporally imminent enough to merit
restriction. Therefore, the clear and present danger test differed substantially from Hand’s
incitement test, which focused on the intent of the speech. Whereas Hand connected speech and
harm with intent—did the speaker intend to bring about harm?—Holmes’ clear and present
danger test connected speech and harm with time—did the speech threaten imminent harm?
Furthermore, until Brandenburg, the Court majority had applied the two tests to different
types of speech. The Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test to attempts at
public advocacy and publishing. Hand’s incitement test had been applied to Communist
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associations and conspiracy to carryout illegal activity. In cases of public advocacy and
publishing, the government was right in worrying about the imminent effects of the speech. In
conspiracy and association cases, however, the government had not grounds to expect and
therefore apply an imminence requirement. Conspiracy did not threaten imminent action; it
threatened future criminal activity. Thus, in lieu of an imminence requirement, the Court applied
a direct incitement, or intent, in cases where an imminence requirement did not make sense.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Brandenburg as a Jumbling of Two Distinct Incitement Tests
In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio,85 which many scholars have called
the modern incitement standard.86 In Brandenburg, the Court reversed the conviction of a Ku
Klux Klansman charged with advocating criminal activity as a means to political reform.
Brandenburg made derogatory remarks toward “negros” and Jews, and said if the government
“continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race,” there might be some “revenge taken.”87 A
local television station filmed and aired the speech. The Ohio government indicted Brandenburg
under the state’s criminal syndicalism laws88 which forbade anyone from advocating the use of
criminal means to accomplish industrial or political reform and voluntarily assembling a group to
advocate the same. Ohio’s statue was almost identical to the California law upheld by the Court
in Whitney v. California89 in 1927 and similar to New York’s criminal anarchy laws upheld in
Gitlow v. New York90 in 1925. The justices, in a short, six-page per curiam opinion, invalidated
the Ohio law and articulated what it understood as the modern incitement standard: “The
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
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advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”91
In invalidating the Ohio syndicalism law, Brandenburg made two contributions to
incitement jurisprudence.92 First, it explicitly overruled Whitney v. California, which had upheld
a conviction for what amounted to indirect incitement.93 Second, it articulated the modern
incitement test including intent to incite, imminence, and likelihood standards. Although the
Court could have done both of these while staying within the bounds of the clear and present
danger test—all three of these elements were present in the Holmes-Brandeis minority rationale
91
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U.S. 290, 297 -298 (1961), "the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."
See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 -261 (1937); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966). A statute
which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental
control. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
…………..
n2 It was on the theory that the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U. S. C. § 2385, embodied such a principle and that it
had been applied only in conformity with it that this Court sustained the Act's constitutionality. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). That this was the basis for Dennis was emphasized in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 320-324 (1957), in which the Court overturned convictions for advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the
Government under the Smith Act, because the trial judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere advocacy,
unrelated to its tendency to produce forcible action.
Brandenburg, supra note 85, at 446-47, n2.
93

Whitney had actually voted against the part of the party platform advocating the overthrow of the government for
which she was being prosecuted. Therefore on the basis of Scales and Noto, her participation in the Communist
Party’s illegal goals were indirect.
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in Whitney—the justices went even further by trying to synthesize the direct incitement and clear
and present danger traditions.94 The Court now claimed the government had to prove both
explicit intent and imminence before it could restrict speech. In synthesizing the two tests,
however, the justices left many contradictions unresolved and failed to explicate the exact reach
of Brandenburg. In fact, the justices did not even acknowledge its attempt to synthesize the two
formerly distinct traditions. They lumped both traditions together using the words “These later
decisions….”95 This section of the paper will closely examine Brandenburg’s text in an attempt
to understand exactly what the justices did in the opinion and demonstrate why the opinion is
ultimately unworkable. Ultimately, since the justices overreached by lumping the two tests
together, lower courts would be better off using the two tests separately and applying them in the
manner and to the situations in which the Court originally applied them—the direct incitement
test in cases of private speech and the clear and present danger test in cases of public speech.
As said above, in invalidating the Ohio syndicalism law, the opinion did two things:
First, it reversed the precedent set by the majority in Whitney v. California.96 Second, it
articulated what it alleged was the modern incitement test. In overruling Whitney, the Court gave
two reasons in two separate parts of the decisions. First, the per curiam opinion a passage from
cited Dennis v. United States97 that acknowledged that since 1927 many of the Court’s majority
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Lynd, supra note 23, at 159-160 (“The importance of Brandenburg lies precisely in the fact that it is neither an
incitement test, nor a clear and present danger test, but a combination of the two, requiring both elements
[incitement and clear and present danger] before speech may be forbidden or proscribed.”); See also, Gunther,
supra note 23, at 722 (“Today’s operative first amendment doctrine, as first enunciated in Brandenburg v. Ohio in
1969, can be viewed as a coalescing of the best features of the two contending approaches.”).
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Brandenburg, supra note 85, at 447 (“These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”).
96

Supra note 26.

97

Dennis, supra note 50, at 507 (“Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the
majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-
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opinions have tended toward the Holmes-Brandeis minority rationale and has abandoned the
majority opinion. It cited many cases from the 1930s and 1940s that had gradually introduced
many aspects of the Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test into majority jurisprudence.
Second, a few paragraphs later on, the justices wrote that they overruled Whitney because in
Whitney the Court had not distinguished between abstract advocacy and direct incitement, or at
least direct and indirect association.98 This finding could have been made on the basis of Hand’s
incitement test, as in Scales and Noto, or on the basis of the incitement standard already in the
Holmes-Brandeis rationale. Given the previous citation from Dennis regarding the adoption of
the Holmes-Brandeis rationale by decisions in the 1930s and 1940s, it seems likely that the
justices overruled Whitney on clear and present danger grounds. By reading these two passages
together, it would seem that the justices adopted the Holmes-Brandeis concurring rationale in
Whitney, which included an incitement, imminence, and likelihood standards. The justices had
no need to even discuss the direct incitement tradition.
The justices, however, went further than merely invalidating the statute on abstract versus
concrete advocacy grounds already present within the clear and present danger test. The Court
also laid down what they understood to be the controlling “constitutional principle” for
incitement based on previous precedents, thus rearticulating the clear and present danger test.
The modern incitement test articulated by Brandenburg, which included incitement, imminence,
Brandeis rationale.”). This Dennis passage cites Craig v. Harney , 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida
, 328 U.S. 331, 333-36 (1946); Bridges v. California , 314 U.S. 252, 260-63 (1941); Thomas v. Collins , 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945); Taylor v. Mississippi , 319 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88, 104-06
(1940); West Virginia Board of Educations v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Carlson v. California , 310 U.S. 106,
113 (1940); and Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U.S. 308, 311 (1940).
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Brandenburg, supra note 85, at 448-49 (“Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own
words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly
with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be supported, and that
decision is therefore overruled.”).
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and likelihood standards, makes since if the decisions merely meant to adopt the HolmesBrandeis rationale. All three elements were present in Whitney’s concurring opinion, and as
Dennis had noted, majority opinions since then had tended toward it.99 Brandenburg merely
rearticulated what earlier clear and present danger cases had already established. If this were the
case, Court merely cited Dennis as evidence, but not as an authority. Therefore, the Court could
have done everything it did in Brandenburg by merely citing cases already within the clear and
present danger tradition. Moreover, it is clear that if the Court would have done so,
Brandenburg would only apply to similar clear and present danger cases—as opposed to
conspiracy cases like Dennis where the Court had gone to lengths to distinguish between clear
and present danger and conspiracy.
Even though the Court could have done everything it did by staying within the clear and
present danger tradition, it reached outside and attempted to bring together both Holmes and
Hand’s traditions. In articulating the modern incitement test, the Court actually cited cases from
Hand’s direct incitement tradition instead of the clear and present danger tradition.100 In failing
to distinguish between the two traditions and instead treating them as if they were one, the Court
ignored a major premise of Dennis, i.e. Dennis was not a clear and present danger case.
Nonetheless, the modern standard, including incitement, imminence, and likelihood, cited Noto
along with Dennis and Yates as precedents even though none of these cases included an
imminence standard. Although the test was in reality a restatement of the Holmes-Brandeis
99

See supra section II. B.

100

Brandenburg, supra note 85, at 447. The footnote to this sentence reads:

n2 It was on the theory that the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U. S. C. § 2385, embodied such a principle and that it
had been applied only in conformity with it that this Court sustained the Act's constitutionality. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). That this was the basis for Dennis was emphasized in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 320-324 (1957), in which the Court overturned convictions for advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the
Government under the Smith Act, because the trial judge's instructions had allowed conviction for mere advocacy,
unrelated to its tendency to produce forcible action.
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standard from their Whitney concurrence, the Court cited direct incitement cases. Dennis, Yates,
and Noto required the government to prove direct incitement or explicit intent instead of
imminence. These cases only required incitement and likelihood (or “improbability”) standards.
None of the cases cited included an imminence requirement. By citing cases from Hand’s direct
incitement tradition when the Court really should have been citing cases from the clear and
present tradition, the Court failed to acknowledge the distinction between the two traditions.
Before Brandenburg, the Court had either applied one tradition or another. Since the
circumstances of Brandenburg clearly fit within the clear and present danger tradition, the Court
had no precedent in applying Hand’s direct incitement standard. There was not compelling
reason to attempt to apply a direct incitement standard. The government was worried about the
imminent harm threatened by the speech, not the future threat. Thus, the application of Hand’s
direct incitement test was arbitrary and unnecessary.
In addition to conflating the two tests, the Court also failed to explicate Brandenburg’s
reach. Since the justices cited sources from both traditions, it would appear that Brandenburg’s
ambit covers cases in both traditions. The per curiam opinion’s treatment of Dennis as well as
evidence in the concurring opinions, however, seem to make this assumption questionable.
Implicitly, the Court overruled Dennis because it did not include an imminence standard. If
Brandenburg was supposed to be the modern incitement standard bridging both direct incitement
and clear and present danger traditions, then Dennis must have been overruled. The Court,
however, does not explicitly overrule Dennis, although it did explicitly overrule Whitney. In
addition, it cited it as if Dennis and Brandenburg were in full agreement by not acknowledging
their differences. Therefore, the relationship between the two cases is unclear.
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Evidence from concurring opinions shows that the Court itself many have been divided
as to whether Brandenburg overruled Dennis or not.101 Some members of the Court did think
that Brandenburg overruled Dennis. Justice Douglas wrote, “My own view is quite different. I
see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any ‘clear and present danger’ test,
whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis
rephrased it.”102 Justice Black wrote:
I agree with the views expressed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in his concurring
opinion in this case that the "clear and present danger" doctrine should have no
place in the interpretation of the First Amendment. I join the Court's opinion,
which, as I understand it, simply cites [Dennis] but does not indicate any
agreement on the Court's part with the "clear and present danger" doctrine on
which Dennis purported to rely.103
Although these two justices explicitly wanted Brandenburg to overrule Dennis, the majority of
the Court did not seem to want to go that far.104 In declining to explicitly uphold or overrule
Dennis, especially when an argument could be made for either, the Court majority left the
relationship between the two cases murky and open to interpretation.
In sum, the Court could have invalidated Ohio’s syndicalism law by using only clear and
present danger logic, which already included incitement, imminence, and likelihood standards.
Instead, however, the Court attempted to synthesize the clear and present danger test and the
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Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg Decision—A Lawgiver in Action, 79 Judicature 24
(1995).
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Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). It seems from this case that Douglas
did not acknowledge that Dennis was a clear and present danger case in rhetoric only and that the Court had taken
pains to distinguish it from earlier clear and present danger case.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
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By 1969, only two members of the Dennis court were still sitting on the Supreme Court. Justices Douglas and
Black, who had dissented in Dennis because it was not speech protective enough, were the only ones remaining.
However, among the newer members was Justice Harlan, who wrote the Yates opinion upholding the Dennis while
drawing the line between abstract advocacy and incitement to action, and Justices Stewart and White, neither of
whom were known to be “liberal” justices, were not likely to overturn long established precedents. See Rohr, Grand
supra note 21, at 6. See also, Schwartz, supra note 101, at 237.
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direct incitement test into one modern incitement standard. The Court tried to make the
government prove both direct incitement and imminence in order to restrict speech. In doing so,
however, the Court overstepped its bounds and did not properly recognize that the distinction
between the two traditions. It cited Hand’s direct incitement tradition as precedent for the clear
and present danger test. It also cited the direct incitement tradition as precedent for an
imminence standard even though the direct incitement tradition had never included an
imminence standard. Instead of citing Hand’s direct incitement tradition, the Court would have
been on firmer doctrinal ground to stay with the clear and present danger tradition and cited its
already existing incitement and imminence standards.
In light of the Court’s improper synthesis of the two tests and in lieu of any explanation
of the synthesis, the courts should rethink Brandenburg. Due to the inadequate synthesis of the
incitement and clear and present danger traditions in Brandenburg, the courts should re-divide
the two tests and apply them separately in appropriate situations. In re-dividing the tests, the
Court should apply the clear and present danger test to public speech that threatens imminent
lawless action—such as the Ku Klux Klan rally in Brandenburg, the labor rallies in Thomas v.
Collins and Thornhill v. Alabama, and seditious publications in Gitlow v. New York, Abrams v.
United States, and Schenk v. United States. The Court should apply the incitement test to private
speech and when the imminence standard has no basis to be applied—such as in conspiracy and
association cases like Dennis, Yates, Scales, and Noto. By applying the cases separately, the
Court will remain within the solid foundations set by earlier precedents.
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Chapter 4
The Court’s Application of Brandenburg since 1969
Since 1969, the courts have never applied Brandenburg in cases of non-public advocacy of
criminal activity. Since then, the Supreme Court has had two chances to explicate its meaning:
Indiana v. Hess105 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.106 In both of these cases, the Supreme
Court applied Brandenburg to advocacy of criminal activity that took place at public rallies.
And, in both cases, the Court found that the speech did not threaten imminent lawless action.
In Indiana v. Hess, the defendant was being prosecuted for incitement to violence for
saying that he and a group of war protesters would "take the fucking street later," or "We'll take
the fucking street again"—meaning that he would return after the police had left to continue the
protest. The majority, in a per curiam opinion, applied the Brandenburg test and found that the
speech was directed toward future action that was not likely and may not have even intended to
produce imminent lawless action.107 Hess’s speech fails all three prongs of the Brandenburg
test—intent to incite, imminence, and likelihood. In addition, Hess’s speech was similar to the
speech in Brandenburg; therefore, Hess sheds little light on Brandenburg’s applicability outside
public advocacy.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the Court considered whether threats made by
Charles Evers, a NAACP organizer, against blacks who violated a boycott against white
businesses in Alabama, amounted to unprotect speech. The Court found that even though Evers’
105

414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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Hess, supra note 105, at 108 (“At best, however, the statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation;
at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time….Since the
uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess' statement was not directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot
be said that he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action. And since there was no evidence, or rational
inference from the import of the language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent
disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had "a 'tendency to lead to
violence.'").
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speech was an incitement to violence, it was protected because the resulting violence could not
be temporally tied to the speech. The Court found that the speech did not produce imminent
lawless action.108 The Court defined imminence temporally as the amount of time elapsed
between the speech and criminal action. Claiborne Hardware also did not shed any more light
on the applicability outside of public speech—the circumstances of in Claiborne were also very
similar to those in Brandenburg.
In both of the above cases, the Supreme Court applied Brandenburg in similar
circumstances—public speech that could have been dealt with using the clear and present danger
test as developed pre-Brandenburg. In both cases, the government was worried about the threat
of lawless action. The Court, however, found that since neither case threatened imminent lawless
action, the government could not prohibit the speech. In Hess, the government found that the
speech failed all three parts of Brandenburg—incitement, imminence, and likelihood—and
therefore was protected. In Claiborne Hardware, the Court found that since the lawless action
occurred months after the speech, there was no threat of imminent harm. The connection
between the speech and harm was not temporally direct. Both two cases dealt with
circumstances where the imminence standard naturally applied, and they could have been
adequately addressed with the pre-Brandenburg clear and present danger test. Therefore, it is
clear that since 1969, the Brandenburg test has only been applied as the modern formulation of
the clear and present danger test.
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NAACP, supra note 106, at 928 (“If that language had been followed by acts of violence, a substantial question
would be presented whether Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct. In this case,
however - with the possible exception of the Cox incident - the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred weeks or
months after the April 1, 1966, speech.”).
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Chapter 5
Applying the Incitement Test to Advocacy of Terrorism
In the wake of September 11, however, America has been faced with the problem of how to deal
with advocacy of radical Islamic terrorism. Even though some scholars have called advocacy of
terrorism the source of terrorist activity, the First Amendment restrains America from
prosecuting everyone who utters ill against the government. America, however, does not have to
choose between fighting terrorism and allowing speech. Justice Jackson once wrote, “The
choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without
either.”109 Thus, America is not restricted to choosing between terrorism and speech. The
nation, however, must find a way to accommodate speech while still protecting itself against
enemy threats. This is the task of the Court in a post-September 11 America.
In applying an appropriate speech standard to advocacy of terrorism, the courts must
apply a standard that stands firmly upon precedent and is appropriate to the type of speech in
question. Because advocacy of terrorism is so complex, it must be dealt with practically. In this
section, I will give two examples of how the courts have dealt with advocacy of terrorism. In the
first case, which concerned public speech, the court should have applied the clear and present
danger test, but did not. In the second case, which concerned private advocacy of terrorism, the
direct incitement test should have been applied. In analyzing these cases, I will show how a twotest approach to incitement clears up confusion over how to treat advocacy of terrorism. In this
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Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (the whole passage reads: In reversing the
conviction of the defendant, the Court “has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty means the
removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local attempts to maintain order are impairments of the
liberty of the citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy
without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom,
it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”).
Justice Jackson’s formulation of the liberty-order dichotomy underscores the Declaration of Independence, which
recognizes the negotiated nature of both liberty and order, and acknowledges the necessity of balancing the two. See
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776).
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way, courts should use either Hand’s direct incitement test or the clear and present danger test
according to the circumstances of a particular instance of speech.
The first example deals with isolated instances of public advocacy of criminal activity.
In United States v. Rahman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction of
Ahmad Ali Rahman, an Islamic cleric convicted for masterminding the 1993 attack on the World
Trade Center in New York. While Rahman was not involved in the detailed planning of the
attacks, he made public speeches at mosques calling on his followers to make war against the
United States and to take action to further Jihad.110 The question before the Court was whether
Rahman could be prosecuted for direct incitement of terrorism. Although the circumstances of
Rahman’s speech are very similar to Brandenburg v. Ohio—public advocacy of criminal
activity111—the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not apply Brandenburg, the clear and
present danger test, or Dennis.112 Instead, ignoring the well-established distinction between
concrete incitement and abstract advocacy, it found that Rahman’s speech constituted seditious
conspiracy and therefore had no protection at all.113 Since the speech involved in Rahman is
very similar to the speech in Brandenburg, Hess, and Claiborne, the Court should have applied
Brandenburg in the same manner—as the modern articulation of the clear and present danger
test.
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United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (1999). One scholar has described Rahman’s role as “limited to fiery
sermons and sispensing religious advice in the form of interpretations of Islamic law….There is apparently no
evidence that Rahman ever came in contact with, let alone touched, and explosive device or other wise participated
in the conspiracy.” Keehn, supra note 8, at 1250.
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Rahman’s speech occurred before 1993 and prior to America’s “War on Terror.”
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See, Rahman, supra note 110, at 114-16 (Seditious conspiracy was “further removed for the realm of
constitutionally protected speech than those at issue in Dennis and its progeny,” noting that the speech in Dennis is
even further removed from the public, ideological speech in Brandenburg.).
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Id. at 117 (1999) (“One is not immunized from prosecution for such speech-based offenses merely because one
commits them through the medium of political speech or religious preaching….If the evidence shows that the
speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the
laws, the prosecution is permissible. See United States v. Spock, 416 f.2d 165, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1969).”).
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Consistent with what has been argued above, the Court should have applied either the
clear and present danger test or Hand’s direct incitement test. Considering the particular
circumstances of Rahman’s case were similar to Brandenburg and previous cases in which the
clear and present danger test had been applied, the Court should have applied the clear and
present danger test. In applying this test, the Court should have determined whether Rahman
intended to produce imminent lawless action and was likely to produce such action. Under the
circumstances, Rahman’s speech did intend to incite lawless action and obviously was likely to
produce such action. The action, however, was not temporally imminent. Therefore, Rahman’s
speech should have been protected. Applied in this manner to public, ideological advocacy, the
clear and present danger test would evaluate whether speech was intended to produce imminent
lawless action and whether it will likely produce that action. There is no need to even reference
cases in Hand’s direct incitement tradition.
Another example of advocacy of terrorist activity can be seen in United States v. AlTimimi.114 In 2006, a jury convicted Ali Al-Timimi, a cleric at the Dar al-Arqam Center in Falls
Church, VA, for inciting terrorism against the United States. Al-Timimi’s conviction centered
on advice he gave to eight followers at a secret meeting on the night of September 16, 2001, just
a few days after the September 11 attacks.115 This meeting was so secret that the window blinds
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The facts in the Al-Timimi case are taken from the indictment, United States v. Al-Timimi, 1:04cr385 (2004),
and the related case of Unite States v. Kahn, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. VA, 2004), aff’d 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. Va.,
2006). The actual court decision could not be obtained. A nearly complete account of the fact of the Al-Timimi
case can be found in the district court opinion in Khan. See also, Tanenbaum, supra note 5. In writing an article
specifically on the Al-Timimi case, Tanenbaum wrote that “there is no formal court opinion from which to draw the
facts…aside from the related opinion affirming the conviction of Al-Timimi’s associates in United States v. Khan”
Id at n1. See also, Terry Friedan, Muslim Cleric Convicted: Urged followers to fight U.S. after September 11,
CNN.COM, APRIL 26, 2005, AT http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/26/cleric.trial/; and Jerry Markon, Jurors
Convict Muslim Leader in Terrorism Case, WASH. POST, APRIL 27, 2005, AT A01 .
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Al-Timimi’s followers attended the Dar al Arqam Islamic center in Falls Church, VA were Al-Timimi often
lectured. Al-Timimi preached on the necessity of Muslims to engage violent Jihad against the enemies of Islam.
His followers were also members of a military style paintball group where members practiced military drills.
Members of the paintball group were required to follow three rules: do not tell anyone about the group, do not bring
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were drawn, the phones were unplugged, and, when a person from outside the group showed up,
the meeting was suspended until he left. During that meeting, Al-Timimi claimed that the
September 11 attacks were justified and that the “end time battle had begun.” He counseled his
followers to leave the United States and defend the Muslims in Afghanistan against an American
attack by fighting with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. As support, Al-Timimi cited fatwas calling on
Muslims to defend Afghanistan. Within a month, four of the meeting’s attendees were training
in terrorist camps in Pakistan.116 Although Al-Timimi did not actually undertake any overt
actions against the United States himself, he was nonetheless convicted for inciting his followers
to make war against the United States. The government indicted and convicted him for
conspiracy to make war against the United States even though he did not undertake overt acts to
accomplish the conspiracy. The Court found that his speech was a direct cause of his followers’
crimes. The jury convicted him of incitement to terrorist activity on the grounds of conspiracy.
If the courts were to apply Brandenburg to this case, the government would have to show
that Al-Timimi’s case was (1) an incitement that (2) threatened imminent lawless action and was
(3) likely to produce that action. Although Al-Timimi’s speech did include aspects of abstract
advocacy—advocating a religious doctrine and an Islamic world view—it is easy to see that his
speech did in fact incite his followers to travel to Afghanistan and fight against the United States.
His comments were both explicit and direct, and his intent is easily enough established. Given
the context of the post-September 11 world, global Jihad or holy war, and the fact that his
followers actually carried out the actions, Al-Timimi’s speech was likely to produce the action
he incited. Therefore, the only question left is whether the action Al-Timimi incited was

anyone to meetings or paintball practices, and invoke the Fifth Amendment if questioned by the police. Kahn, supra
note 114, at 483.
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Id. at 810-11.
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imminent. Given that it took his followers over a month to arrive in Pakistan and begin training,
his speech hardly posed an imminent danger in the strictest sense.
This raises the question of whether it matters if Al-Timimi’s speech had imminent effects
or not. Would his speech create any less harm to the United States if his followers began
fighting against the United States the next day or the next year? The Court faced this same
situation in Dennis. Then, the Court determined that the Communist leaders were not planning
imminent action. They were planning to take action as soon as circumstances would permit at
some future point. Even though the imminent requirement does not apply, the intent to produce
criminal action was still there. Al-Timimi spoke and his followers engaged in unlawful activity
as a direct consequence of his speech. Al-Timimi directly incited his followers to action; he
intended to incite criminal activity regardless of the timing. There was a direct connection
between his intent and harm done. Therefore, it is clear that since Brandenburg’s imminence
requirement cannot easily or logically be applied, the courts should not bother applying either
Brandenburg or the clear and present danger test.
In lieu of applying Brandenburg or the clear and present danger test, the courts should
apply the direct incitement test, determining if the speech is a direct incitement to criminal
activity, and, if so, if the gravity of the evil, less its probability, warrants prohibition. There is no
question that Al-Timimi’s speech was a direct incitement with unambiguous intent. It took place
at a secret meeting where he explicitly counseled his followers to engage in war against the
United States by fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. There is also no question about the
gravity and probability of the action—fighting against one’s own country is certainly a grave
offense that any government has the right to punish. And, since Al-Timimi’s followers actually
did travel and fight, the action was likely. Therefore, under the direct incitement test, the
government could punish Al-Timimi for his speech.
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Together Rahman and Al-Timimi illuminate how advocacy of terrorism is better dealt with by
using the clear and present danger test and the direct incitement test separately. Rahman is an
example of how the clear and present danger protects public, ideological advocacy. Al-Timimi,
on the other hand, is an example of how Brandenburg and its imminence requirement are
inadequate to deal with non-public advocacy of terrorism. Therefore, the public/private nature of
the speech should trigger whether the courts apply either the direct incitement or the clear and
present danger test.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Although some scholars have tried to find a way to prosecute advocacy of terrorism from within
the confines of Brandenburg, none have convincingly done so. One scholar suggests that the
courts both skirt Brandenburg’s imminence requirement by applying it contextually instead of
temporally, or bypass Brandenburg altogether and apply Dennis to advocacy of terrorism.117 No
scholars, however, have satisfactorily navigated their way through Brandenburg to show how
and why the temporal imminence requirement can be applied to advocacy of terrorism. By
deconstructing Brandenburg, however, we can see how the courts can best deal with advocacy of
terrorism by applying by Hand’s direct incitement tradition separately from the clear and present
danger test.
Prior to the 1969 Brandenburg decision, the Court’s incitement jurisprudence consisted
of two distinct traditions: a direct incitement tradition originating from Judge Hand’s opinion in
Masses v. Patten Publishing, and a clear and present danger test stemming from Justice Holmes’
opinion in Schenck v. United States. The incitement test focused on the connection between the
speaker’s intent and the harm threatened, and was applied to private speech. The clear and
present danger test focused on the temporal connection between the speech and the harm, and
was applied to public speech. In Brandenburg, the Court synthesized the two tests, but without
explaining their connection. In combining the tests, the Court it did not work out their internal
contradictions and blurred the lines between the two traditions. In overruling Whitney v.
California and articulating a three part incitement test, the Court could have relied solely on
cases within the clear and present danger tradition. It went further, however, and unnecessarily
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jumbled the two traditions together. The justices cited cases from Hand’s direct incitement
tradition as precedents for an imminence requirement and did not explicitly note which tradition
it relied on as the basis for its distinction between abstract advocacy versus incitement—it could
have relied on either. In doing this, the Court left a murky decision full of internal
contradictions. Therefore, Brandenburg’s usefulness and reach are both questionable and on
shaky constitutional grounds.
Since the Court did not convincingly synthesize the two traditions, it in effect left them
independently intact. For public speech threatening imminent lawless action, the courts should
apply the clear and present danger test as developed in the Holmes-Brandeis minority in Whitney
v. California—intent to incite, imminence, and likelihood. In practice, since 1969, the courts
have only applied Brandenburg along these lines. In instances of private speech where the
imminence requirement does not apply, the courts should apply Hand’s incitement test as
developed in Masses v. Patten and Dennis v. United States—where speech is a direct incitement
to criminal activity, the government can restrict it so long as the gravity of the evil threatened,
minus its improbability, warrants restriction. By applying a direct incitement test to advocacy of
terrorism, judges and scholars are able to deal with terrorist threats in a way that respects both
speech and national security. Ultimately, the courts should abandon Brandenburg as the catchall
standard for criminal advocacy and instead apply either the clear and present danger test or the
direct incitement test accordingly in appropriate situations.
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